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The Role of Choice Architecture 
in Promoting Saving at Tax Time:  
Evidence from a Large-Scale Field Experiment 
Michal Grinstein-Weiss,* Cynthia Cryder, Mathieu R. Despard,  
Dana C. Perantie, Jane E. Oliphant, and Dan Ariely 
Abstract 
A large-scale field experiment (N = 646,116) from the Refund to Savings Initiative tested a choice 
architecture and persuasive messaging intervention that increased saving among low-moderate income 
(LMI) consumers by approximately 50% during tax refund time. Two follow-up experiments parsed 
components of the intervention. The first follow-up experiment (N = 569) tested the messaging and 
choice architecture interventions separately, finding that each can increase savings. A final follow-up 
experiment (N = 554) tested individual elements of the choice architecture intervention, 
demonstrating that mere mention of savings within choice options was not sufficient to increase 
saving, however, heavy emphasis of savings and making saving “frictionless” within choice options 
both effectively increased saving intentions. The final experiment also demonstrated that the choice 
architecture effect operates similarly for both LMI and non-LMI consumers. 
Keywords: Choice Architecture, Decision Making, Savings, Persuasion, Financial Decision Making 
American households, including low- and moderate-income (LMI) households in particular, do not 
have enough savings to cover unforeseen expenses. Nationally representative data from the Pew 
Charitable Trusts1 show that 41% of households do not have liquid savings to cover a $2,000 
expense in the case of an emergency; for low-income families that rate increases to 78%. Yet, 
financial emergencies are frequent: 60% of American households report a financial shock within the 
past year.2  
Tax refunds offer potential relief to LMI households. A substantial percentage of LMI households 
are eligible for tax refunds,3 and these refunds constitute a sizeable portion of annual income for 
LMI consumers (often equating an entire month of pay).4  Tax refund time has been identified as a 
“savable moment” for LMI consumers5 and may be the only time of the year when LMI consumers 
reasonably can afford to set aside money as savings.6,7 In this research, we test the influence of a 
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persuasive messaging and choice architecture intervention on LMI consumers’ real and simulated 
decisions to put money into savings accounts at tax refund time.   
The use of persuasive messaging to influence behavior is ubiquitous in both commercial marketing 
and public policy campaigns, often with substantial influence.8,9 Choice architecture, another 
approach to influencing decisions, involves the organization of decision contexts to influence 
choices, typically in ways that do not change the actual options that are available.10 Choice 
architecture has been shown to influence decisions as consequential as environmental efficiency,11 
retirement savings,12 and organ donation.13 
Although there are numerous instances where both persuasive messaging and choice architecture 
effectively alter decisions, there also are numerous instances where each fails to do so.14,15,16 
Interventions that effectively encourage savings decisions among LMI consumers may be 
particularly difficult to construct because LMI consumers have strong and pre-planned preferences 
regarding refund allocation, leaving little opportunity to influence saving decisions.17,18 In a previous 
iteration of the R2S project, for example, it was found that varying a suggested impetus for saving 
(general goals, retirement, or emergencies) had no influence on savings deposit behavior.19 
In this research, we develop an intervention relying on persuasive messaging and choice architecture 
to increase savings as part of the Refund to Savings Initiative, a large and ongoing project aimed at 
increasing savings allocations at tax refund time among low- and moderate-income (LMI) filers.  We 
report findings from three experiments. Experiment 1 (N = 646,116) tests the effect of a messaging 
and choice architecture intervention on real savings accounts deposits at tax refund time. 
Experiment 2 (N = 569), a follow-up online experiment, separates the messaging and choice 
architecture interventions to gauge the unique influence of each. Finally, Experiment 3 (N = 554), 
also conducted online, isolates individual components of the choice architecture manipulation to 
determine which features are essential for increasing savings. 
Experiment 1: Tax Refund Field Experiment 
In experiment 1, we rely on a large-scale field experiment to test whether messaging and choice 
architecture interventions increase the amount of refund money allocated to savings accounts by 
LMI consumers at tax time. The experiment is part of the R2S initiative, an ongoing collaboration 
between researchers at Washington University, Duke University, and Intuit, Inc. The experiment 
was embedded inside the TurboTax Freedom Edition (TTFE) tax preparation software offered free 
to qualified LMI tax filers as a part of the IRS Free File Program.20 During the 2015 tax season, filers 
qualified for the TTFE if they had an adjusted gross income (AGI) of under $31,000, if they 
qualified for the Earned Income Tax Credit, or if a member of the household was on active military 
duty and had an AGI of under $60,000. The experiment ran from January 16th through June 7th 2015. 
Intuit shared anonymous, aggregated tax data with the researchers in accordance with 26 U.S. Code 
§ 7216. 
Participants 
Participants (n = 646,116, MAge = 35) were individuals who used TTFE and received a federal tax 
refund when filing in 2015.  Mean gross income was just over $15,000 (see Table 1 for sample 
characteristics). 
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Table 1. Experiment 1 (Field Experiment) Sample Description (n = 646,116) 
Group assignment N 
Precautionary saving (“Be Prepared”) 161,011 
Interactive goal 161,936 
Interactive retirement 161,217 
Control 161,952 
  
Demographics % or Mean (SD) 
Age1 35.25 (15.47) 
Filing Status  
Single 66.84% 
Head of Household 22.85% 
Married, filing jointly, widow(er) 9.39% 
Married, filing separately 0.92% 
Any dependents 31.37% 
Number of dependents (excluding none) 1.71 (0.89) 
Gross annual income 15,055 (9,941) 
Amount of federal tax refund 2,030 (2,379) 
Note: Means are weighted across groups. 
1 Calculated based on the difference between the weighted means of birthdate at tax 
filing and filing date. 
 
Procedure 
Participants were randomly assigned to a control group or one of three intervention groups. 
Random assignment occurred within the TTFE software after participants completed their federal 
income tax returns and learned they would receive a federal tax refund. Participants randomly 
assigned to the control group received the standard TTFE screen on which they were prompted to 
indicate how they wished to receive their refund (see Appendix A for screenshots of all experimental 
conditions). These control group participants were asked whether they wished to receive their 
refund via direct deposit into a bank account, via paper check, or split into multiple accounts or a 
US Series I Savings Bond. If participants chose to receive their refund via direct deposit, on a 
subsequent screen they were prompted to enter a bank account routing number, which could be 
either for a checking account or a savings account.  The refund amount allocated to savings 
accounts served as our primary outcome of interest.  
Participants in all 3 intervention groups, by contrast, viewed a savings-emphasis “choice 
architecture” screen in which the option to deposit their refund into a savings account was explicitly 
included in the top two options, the third option included direct deposit of the entire refund into a 
checking or other bank account, and a final option included receipt of a paper check (see Appendix 
A for screenshots of all experimental conditions). 
In addition, participants in the three intervention groups were randomly assigned to receive 1) a 
message about emergency savings,21,22,23,24 2) a message about saving for one’s future that included 
an optional interactive component encouraging participants to select specific future financial goals, 
or 3) a message about retirement savings that also included an optional interactive component 
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encouraging participants to select specific retirement savings goals (see Appendix A for exact 
messaging).  
Results 
We report how we determined our sample size, all data exclusions, all manipulations, and all 
measures in the study25 (please also see supplemental materials). 
Sample balance 
Sample balance was assessed across the four experimental groups for the following participant 
demographic characteristics: age, 2014 gross income, filing status, number of dependents, health 
insurance status, military status, and refund amount. In addition, we assessed sample balance based 
on several additional variables that served as proxies for the financial characteristics and 
circumstances of participants. These included any income from the following sources: dividends or 
distributions, bank account interest, certain government payments (e.g., unemployment benefits), 
retirement plan distributions, and/or social security benefits. Additionally, sample balance was 
assessed for child, student loan, and/or higher education expense-related (i.e., American 
Opportunity and Lifetime Learning) tax credits, for mortgage interest, real estate tax, medical 
expenses, self-employed health insurance, and moving expenses deductions, and for tax filing date. 
All aggregate data bivariate tests for these covariates were statistically non-significant, indicating that 
randomization was effective and that the four groups did not differ in any systematic way regarding 
participant characteristics that might explain variation in savings outcomes. 
Main results 
The refund amount allocated to savings accounts served as our primary outcome of interest. Though 
a savings bond purchase was an option in all conditions, we excluded this as a dependent variable on 
a substantive basis. We are most interested in low- and moderate-income households having access 
to liquid financial assets in savings accounts to meet household needs. Furthermore, the overall rate 
of savings bond purchases was extremely low (< .1% in each condition); incorporating savings bond 
uptake into the outcome measure does not meaningfully influence results.  
Participants in each of the three intervention groups were significantly more likely to deposit to 
savings accounts than were participants in the control group.  For example, 13% of participants who 
received the emergency savings intervention allocated all or a portion of their refunds to a savings 
account compared to 8% of control group participants χ2(1, n = 358,097) = 1600, p < .001 (see 
Table 2 for full results).  
Table 2.  Treatment Effects (n = 646,116). 
Outcome 
 
Control 
Emergency 
Savings Interactive Goals Interactive Retirement 
Percent who saved  8.44% 13.34%*** 12.60%*** 12.40%*** 
Percent who saved entire refund 7.92% 12.54%*** 11.83%*** 11.63%*** 
Mean amount saved (SD) 
$160.25  
($856.15) 
$243.76*** 
($1032.69) 
$229.52*** 
($1004.87) 
$228.26*** 
($1001.43) 
Note: *** p < .001. 
 
THE ROLE OF CHOICE ARCHITECTURE IN PROMOTING SAVING AT TAX TIME: EVIDENCE FROM A LARGE-SCALE FIELD EXPERIMENT 
C E N T E R  F O R  S O C I A L  D E V E L O P M E N T  
W A S H I N G T O N  U N I V E R S I T Y  I N  S T .  L O U I S  
5  
In addition, within treatment groups, participants who received the emergency savings intervention 
were significantly more likely to deposit to savings accounts than were participants who received the 
future savings interactive message χ2(1, n = 364,815) = 30.14, p < .001 and retirement savings 
interactive message, χ2(1, n = 363,689) = 48.56, p < .001. There was no statistically significant 
difference in the rate of depositing to savings when comparing the interactive future goal and 
interactive retirement goal messages χ2(1, n = 323,153) = 2.85, p = .09. In total, the treatment 
conditions led to an additional 20,916 tax filers depositing into savings vehicles.   
Examining average amount saved reveals similar patterns. Participants in each intervention group 
deposited significantly more money to savings than did participants in the control group (see Table 
2). For example, participants who received the interactive retirement intervention deposited an 
average of $68 more to savings accounts than control group participants t(315,104) = 20.74, Cohen’s 
d = 0.07, p < .001. In total, the net increase in the refund saved due to treatments was $35,625,127.  
Some statistically significant differences in savings deposits were observed between intervention 
groups as well. Participants who received the emergency savings intervention on average deposited 
$14 and $16 more to savings respectively than participants who received the interactive future goal 
t(322,593) = 3.97, Cohen’s d = 0.01, p < .001 and interactive retirement t(321,896) = 4.33, Cohen’s d 
= 0.02, p < .001 interventions. There was no statistically significant difference in average savings 
deposits when comparing the interactive future goal and interactive retirement goal messages 
t(323,151) = 0.36, p = .72. 
Sub-group outcomes 
Treatment effects for both savings deposit rates and average amount deposited to savings were very 
stable across differences in both filing status and age (see Table 3). For example, intervention group 
participants who filed as Single deposited $43 more to savings than their control group counterparts (p < 
.001), while intervention group participants who filed as Head of Household deposited $138 more to 
savings than their control group counterparts (p < .001). The higher net difference observed among 
Head of Household filers in the intervention group was due to a larger average refund (n = 110,559 
MRefund = $4,796.15) compared to Single filers in the intervention group (n = 323,679 MRefund = $860.08).  
 
Table 3. Treatment Effects by Subgroup 
 Savings Rate  Amount Saved 
 
Control 
% 
Intervention 
% 
 Control 
Mean (SD) 
Intervention 
Mean (SD) 
Filing Status      
 Single (n = 431,879) 8.26 12.93***  65.61 (338.85) 108.81 (448.65)*** 
 Head of Household (n = 147,646) 7.47 9.88***  390.84 (1448.35) 529.08 (1670.77)*** 
Age       
 15 to 24 (n = 211,605) 10.37 15.24***  81.19 (462.23) 119.13 (543.55)*** 
 25 to 34 (n = 180,352) 6.52 11.41***  179.79 (930.89) 284.46 (1134.25)*** 
 35 to 44 (n = 90,747) 6.90 9.67***  286.36 (1259.17) 402.80 (1481.16)*** 
 45 to 54 (n = 69,544) 6.99 9.61***  226.31 (1055.81) 300.03 (1193.77)*** 
 55 to 64 (n = 57,833) 6.79 9.83***  153.80 (809.61) 214.53 (931.48)*** 
 65+ (n = 36,035) 6.77 9.78***  89.99 (500.67) 132.99 (622.13)*** 
Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001. 
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Discussion 
Experiment 1 documents a significant and substantial effect of choice architecture and messaging on 
LMI consumers’ real choices to allocate tax refund money to savings accounts. Although one 
particular message (emergency savings) appears somewhat more successful than the other messages, 
the most substantial effect was that all versions of the treatment (choice architecture + messaging) 
considerably increased savings allocations compared to the control condition. In Experiment 2, we 
attempt to isolate and compare the choice architecture and messaging components of the treatment 
manipulation to determine the effectiveness of each intervention. 
Experiment 2: Choice Architecture vs. Messaging 
Experiment 2 tested the Choice Architecture and Messaging manipulations separately in an online 
simulation, gauging the unique influence of each intervention.   
Participants 
Six-hundred participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk and received $0.50 for 
participating. For both Experiments 2 and 3, conducted online via Mechanical Turk, we analyzed 
data only from those participants who passed an instructional manipulation check designed to 
identify inattentive participants.21,26 Recruitment sample size and the exclusion criterion were set ex 
ante. For Experiment 2, this procedure resulted in a total of 569 analyzed responses (MAge = 34, 55% 
female, 45% male). 
Procedure 
All participants were asked to imagine they had just filed their federal income tax returns and 
expected to receive a $1,000 refund. In a 2 (Control, Choice Architecture) x 2 (No Message,  
Figure 1: Experiment 2 amount saved based on choice architecture and messaging interventions. Note: * p < .05; 
*** p < .001. 
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Emergency Savings Message) between subjects experimental design, participants were randomly 
assigned either to view refund allocation options like those from the Control condition or from 
the Choice Architecture conditions in the field experiment; participants also were randomly 
assigned to view either no additional savings messaging, or to view the Emergency Savings 
message from the field experiment (the emergency saving message was found to be the most 
effective message in Experiment 1). After making initial allocation decisions on the experimental 
screens (See Appendix B), subsequent screens guided participants through follow-up aspects of 
their choice including, for example, exactly how much money they wished to allocate to savings 
versus checking accounts. 
Results 
A 2 x 2 ANOVA predicting amount deposited to savings revealed a significant main effect of the 
choice architecture manipulation (F(1, 565) = 24.72, p < .001), a significant main effect of 
emergency savings messaging (F(1, 565) = 6.57, p = .011), and no interaction between the two 
manipulations, p > 0.25. A binary logistic regression predicting whether or not participants directed 
any refund to savings showed similar patterns: a significant main effect of the choice architecture 
manipulation, (Exp(B) = 3.17, p < .001), a significant main effect of emergency savings messaging 
(Exp(B) = 1.93, p = .022), and no interaction between the two manipulations, p > 0.25. 
Discussion 
Experiment 2 tested the messaging and choice architecture manipulations separately. Both 
manipulations from the field experiment increased savings intentions when tested individually, 
within a new context, and with a new sample.  
Experiment 3: Effective Choice Architecture Components 
The final experiment, Experiment 3, tests which elements of the Choice Architecture manipulation 
are essential to increase savings. 
Participants 
Six-hundred participants were recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk and received $0.50 for 
participation. Following procedures from Experiment 2, we analyzed data only from those 
participants who passed an instructional manipulation check designed to identify inattentive 
participants, resulting in a total of 554 analyzed responses (MAge = 35, 56% female, 44% male). 
Table 4. Experiment 2 Savings Outcomes Based on Choice Architecture and Messaging Interventions 
 Amount Saved 
(Mean) 
Percent  
Who Saved 
Percent Who Saved 
Entire Refund 
Control (choice options), No Message $178.57 18% 18% 
Choice Architecture, No Message $369.39*** 41%*** 31%* 
Control (choice options), Emergency Savings Message $280.64* 30%* 27%† 
Choice Architecture, Emergency Savings Message $456.07*** 56%*** 37%*** 
Note: †p < .10; * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001 compared to Control/No Message. 
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Procedure 
Participants imagined that they had just filed their federal income tax returns and expected to receive 
a $1,000 refund. Participants were randomly assigned to one of 5 experimental conditions that varied 
choice option descriptions. The first two conditions (“Control” and “Choice Architecture”) 
replicated the two conditions from Experiment 2 without messaging, simulating the choice 
architecture intervention from Experiment 1. 
The remaining three conditions separately tested the functional pieces of the choice architecture 
intervention. The choice architecture intervention was functionally different from the control 
condition in three main ways: 1) savings was explicitly emphasized within the choice options, tested 
in a “Savings Emphasized” condition, 2) savings explicitly was mentioned twice among the choice 
options, tested in a “Savings Emphasized Twice” condition, and 3) one option included a simple 
one-click single-decision option that allowed participants to make one click to allocate their entire 
refund into savings, tested in a “Savings--Single Click” condition. After making the initial allocation 
decision on the experimental screens (See Appendix C), subsequent screens guided participants 
through detailed aspects of their choice (e.g., exactly how much money they wished to allocate to 
savings versus checking). 
Results 
Replicating the pattern observed in Experiments 1 and 2, planned contrasts revealed that 
participants allocated significantly more money to savings accounts in the Choice Architecture 
condition compared to the Control condition (MChoice Architecture = $340.68, MControl = $190.91 , t(549) = 
2.63, Cohen’s d  = .22, p = 0.009). 
Participants did not, however, allocate more to savings in the Savings Emphasized condition 
(MSavingEmphasized = $174.75 compared to the Control condition p > .25, suggesting that merely 
emphasizing savings one time is not sufficient to influence refund allocations. Participants did 
allocate more to savings in both the Savings Emphasized Twice condition M = $392.73 t(549) = 
Figure 2: Experiment 3 amount saved based on Choice Architecture components. Note: *p < .05; 
**p < .01; ***p < .001, compared to Control. 
THE ROLE OF CHOICE ARCHITECTURE IN PROMOTING SAVING AT TAX TIME: EVIDENCE FROM A LARGE-SCALE FIELD EXPERIMENT 
C E N T E R  F O R  S O C I A L  D E V E L O P M E N T  
W A S H I N G T O N  U N I V E R S I T Y  I N  S T .  L O U I S  
9  
3.45, Cohen’s d  = 0.29, p < 0.001; and Savings—Single Click condition M = $431.86, M = $392.73 
t(549) = 4.26, Cohen’s d  = 0.36, p < 0.001 compared to the Control condition, suggesting that the 
heavy emphasis of savings and/or the increased ease of depositing to savings contribute to the 
Choice Architecture finding (see Figure 2 and Table 4). 
We also analyzed categorical income information from participants’ responses to final demographics 
questions. We find that the savings allocation patterns held for both LMI consumers (defined as 
having annual household incomes at or below $35,000) and non-LMI consumers. We conducted a 
binary logistic regression predicting whether or not participants deposited to savings, including 
categorical predictors for each experimental condition (except Control) and interaction terms 
combining each experimental condition and LMI status. Results mirrored the findings in Table 2 
and further showed no interaction with LMI status: the coefficients for Choice Architecture (p < 
0.002), Savings Emphasized three times (p = 0.001) and Savings-One Click (p < 0.001) were each 
statistically significant whereas Savings Emphasized was not (p > 0.25); none of the interaction 
terms with LMI status was significant (p’s > 0.25).  
Discussion 
Experiment 3 tested individual components of the choice architecture manipulation, demonstrating 
that although heavily emphasizing saving or making saving a simple one-click decision both 
increased savings, simply making saving explicit among choice options via choice architecture was 
not sufficient to increase savings deposits. The result that merely making saving explicit among 
choice options does not increase savings (“Savings emphasized” condition), suggests that the 
patterns from Experiment 1 and 2 are not simply due to reminding consumers that allocating to a 
savings account is an option. In addition, there were no significant differences by income, suggesting 
that the choice architecture intervention may be effective across income groups.  
General Discussion 
Although previous research has struggled to find interventions that effectively increase savings 
among low-moderate income (LMI) consumers,17 the current research documents a robust choice 
architecture and messaging intervention that results in substantially higher savings within this 
financially vulnerable group. Further, this intervention represents a program that could be 
implemented on a large scale because it is both low-touch and low-cost.  
Table 5: Experiment 3 Savings Outcomes Based on Choice Architecture Components 
 
Amount Saved (Mean) Percent Who Saved 
Percent Who Saved 
Entire Refund 
Control $190.91 19% 19% 
Choice Architecture  $340.68** 39%*** 30%* 
Savings Emphasized  $174.76 21% 14% 
Savings Emphasized  Twice $392.73*** 44%*** 35%** 
Savings--Single Click $431.86*** 54%*** 34%** 
Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001, compared to Control. 
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Experiment 1, a large-scale field experiment (N = 646,116) and part of the R2S initiative, documents 
a choice architecture and messaging intervention that increases real deposits to saving accounts 
during tax refund time by LMI consumers by approximately 50%. Experiment 2, an online follow-
up experiment, experimentally separated the choice architecture and messaging components, finding 
that both appear to increase savings deposits. Experiment 3, a final follow-up experiment, tested 
individual features of the choice architecture intervention, finding that heavy emphasis of savings 
and making saving “frictionless” via choice architecture both increase allocations to savings 
accounts, however, explicitly mentioning savings once within choice options does not.   
Although the present research identifies an effective intervention to increase savings deposits at tax 
refund time, some may question whether one-time savings deposits are a meaningful measure of 
“saving” or whether saving is even the most beneficial use of tax refunds. Some recent research27 
finds that low-income tax filers often use refunds to reduce high-interest unsecured debt—an 
important financial priority that we do not capture in the current investigation. Further, some 
additional research finds that when consumers allocate money to savings, they may be unwilling to 
subsequently use those funds to cover non-discretionary expenses,28 potentially prompting the 
future adoption of expensive debt to make ends meet.29 Nevertheless, when consumers do not have 
emergency savings, they may be more likely to use high-cost financial services such as payday loans 
in the future.30 Further, there is some evidence to suggest that saving at tax time has lasting effects: 
in a previous iteration of R2S, households that chose to deposit into savings vehicles at tax time 
were less likely to report material hardships six months after filing their taxes than were households 
who did not deposit to savings at tax time (even after adjusting for observable differences between 
groups).19 Future research exploring long-term financial and psychological health outcomes based on 
these and related interventions would help to direct development of interventions that yield the 
largest possible benefit to consumers’ financial well-being. In sum, this research documents a robust 
choice architecture and messaging intervention that increases real savings accounts deposits among 
financially vulnerable consumers at tax time.
1 Pew Charitable Trusts. (2015a). The Role of Emergency Savings in Family Financial Security: What Resources Do Families Have for 
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Appendix A Supplemental Figure A1. Materials* 
 
                                                            
* Used with permission from Intuit. All rights reserved. 
Control Future Message + Interaction + Choice Architecture 
Emergency Savings Message + Choice Architecture Retirement Message + Interaction + Choice Architecture 
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Appendix B  
Experiment 2: Experiment Materials and Conditions 
 
Messaging Manipulation 
NO MESSAGE  
(NONE) 
 
EMERGENCY SAVINGS MESSAGE  
No one knows what life has in store. In fact, 2 out of 3 people will have an unexpected financial 
emergency in 6 months or less. It pays to save!  
BE PREPARED: Don't let life catch you by surprise. Save something today and have cash on hand 
when it's needed down the road. 
Choice Architecture Manipulation 
 
How would you like to get your 
federal refund? 
o Direct deposit to my bank 
account 
o Mail me a paper check 
o Split into multiple 
accounts 
CONTROL 
How would you like to get your 
federal refund? 
o Direct deposit my entire 
refund into a savings 
account 
o Direct deposit some of my 
refund into a savings 
account, and put some into 
another bank account 
o Direct deposit my entire 
refund into a checking 
account 
o Mail me a paper check 
CHOICE ARCHITECTURE 
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Appendix C  
Experiment 3: Experiment Materials and Conditions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
How would you like to get 
your federal refund? 
o Direct deposit to my bank 
account 
o Mail me a paper check 
o Split into multiple 
accounts 
CONTROL 
How would you like to get 
your federal refund? 
o Direct deposit my entire 
refund into a savings 
account 
o Direct deposit some of my 
refund into a savings 
account, and put some into 
another bank account 
o Direct deposit my entire 
refund into a checking 
account 
o Mail me a paper check 
CHOICE ARCHITECTURE 
How would you like to get 
your federal refund? 
o Direct deposit my entire 
refund or some of my 
refund into a savings 
account 
o Direct deposit my entire 
refund into a checking 
account 
o Mail me a paper check 
Savings Emphasized Once 
How would you like to get 
your federal refund? 
o Direct deposit my entire 
refund into one or more 
savings accounts 
o Direct deposit some of my 
refund into a savings 
account, and put some 
into another bank account 
o Direct deposit my entire 
refund into a checking 
account 
o Mail me a paper check 
Savings Emphasized Twice 
How would you like to get 
your federal refund? 
o Direct deposit my entire 
refund into a savings 
account 
o Direct deposit my entire 
refund or some of my 
refund into a checking 
account  
o Mail me a paper check 
Single-click Savings 
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